Author Archive

Why Protecting “Non-Sensitive” Information Is A Sensitive Subject.

Tuesday, April 5th, 2011

A recent data breach demonstrates some relevant concerns.  Last week a large marketing firm announced that numerous email addresses and possibly names and addresses of customers of some of its large clients (including banks) were compromised.  Some might say email addresses: “No big deal.”  Certainly, in and of themselves, email addresses probably don’t qualify as protected personal data under most, if not all, state data breach laws.  However, the fallout from the breach has proven somewhat concerning, at least on a reputational front.  Numerous articles, blogs, and comments have shown up citing the potential for increased phishing attacks.  More importantly, this breach may increase the potential that “spear-phishing” attacks will be successful.  Spear-phishing occurs when the bad guys have accurate personal data that they know is attributable to a specific business; thus, they can send a customer an email with specific information engendering a much higher likelihood of confidence that the email is genuine, allowing the bad guys to potentially gain additional information needed to do some damage.

From a larger standpoint, this breach demonstrates why businesses must approach privacy and security from an overall information governance standpoint, and internalize privacy decisions in their business offerings.  Artificial acronyms or descriptions about the type of data and its perceived sensitivity, without proper thought and analysis can lead to poor results.  Broad assumptions (i.e. email addresses don’t so much matter) don’t work.  Privacy must be an internalized function embedded within organizational strategic decisions.    A customer name and email address about a bank or brokerage client might be much more sensitive than that of an ordinary retailer providing only brick-and-mortar sales, without offering branded store credit card accounts.  This doesn’t mean that ordinary email addresses don’t need protection, they do (particularly if you say you will protect them in your privacy policy).  It means that businesses must understand the risk behind the information and the way it is managed, without arbitrarily attaching significance or insignificance to it.

Blindly reading laws, rules, or written industry standards and designing programs solely to meet defined requirements won’t always get a business where it needs to be.  Obviously, legal requirements must be interpreted and followed.  However, more than that, a thoughtful approach by those who think about privacy and security implications is desirable.

For that matter, the same ideas apply to the way in which a business deals with a breach.  For example, if email addresses, street addresses, and names are stolen, and there is a concern surrounding “spear-phishing,” it might not be such a great idea for the compromised business to send out notifications via email asking someone to “click-here” for more information (Note: The author has no information that this was, or was not, done in the actual case).  In such a scenario, the business might want to discourage customers from replying to email messages (the exact vector of the phishing attack).

Moral: Be careful about making arbitrary decisions based upon the perceived sensitivity attributed to the type of information without thinking it through.

Have You Really Thought About the Practices You Preach?

Thursday, March 17th, 2011

Your Privacy Policy Could Have Serious Legal Implications

How many times have you seen website terms of use or privacy policies saying something to the effect, “We use industry standard best-practice technology to guarantee your sensitive financial transactions are 100% safe and secure?” When you publish these types of statements, you potentially expose your business to deceptive and/or unfair practices claims by attorneys general, state and federal regulators, and private plaintiffs, particularly if there is a data breach involving sensitive information. From a business perspective you may not like the more watered down version, “While we take reasonable measures to try to protect your sensitive information, we cannot guarantee that your information will be completely secure, etc…” However, industry standards are made to be broken by the nefarious crews who make it their work to steal financial account access numbers, as well as other sensitive, information. If you think that you provide the panacea to all online risk, speak up! You may have discovered the golden goose. Until then, think about publishing more accurate, responsible information for your users and to mitigate your business risk. Besides, being accurate creates user confidence, and these things can be worded in ways to build trust in your brand.

Protecting data applies when it is in transit and at rest. That means that after you receive the data through an encrypted connection, there are risks related to its storage; if, and when, it is unencrypted and used. Interestingly, the recent HBGary Federal hack against a well-known information security firm demonstrated that even those charged with the task of protecting information are susceptible. In creating your public facing policy, have you focused on security after only the transmission stage?

About that encrypted transmission, many times these industry standards utilize Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) technology. You know these, they create the HTTPS standard. We’re often advised to look for the “HTTPS” in the URL heading, or the lock icon in our browser. In my travels I am astonished to learn that some people think these technologies are infallible. So, once that happens, our connection is secure and invincible, right? Well…maybe.

While the detailed workings of TLS and SSL are way beyond this article (and certainly beyond my ability to fully appreciate) it is interesting to note that researchers have found potential vulnerabilities with SSL, or at least with the supporting browser and trusted authorities concepts necessary for its use in typical online transactions. This is not to say that TLS and SSL are not safe. Quite the contrary, the encryption technology provides good protection for sensitive online transactions and should definitely be used. However, they must be configured correctly, the Certificate Authority (CA) must act appropriately, and the client (user) machine must not be compromised. The security and confidentiality sought through the use of SSL depends upon not only the encryption algorithm, but also the browser and the trust aspect inherent in public key cryptography.

Regarding the encryption itself, while some proclaim that they use “industry standard” technology, they might actually not be using it. SSL version 2.0 was known to have several security vulnerabilities. The Payment Card Industry Digital Security Standard (PCI DSS) does not recognize SSL Version 2.0 as secure. Only Version 3.0 or other later TLS standards may be considered.

Browsers by default can be loaded to trust numerous CA’s. CA’s are entrusted to determine that the site that it claims to be, is actually that site as claimed. In the past researchers had found that known vulnerable certificates had not been revoked by some CA’s, and theoretical or actual “collisions” where a man-in-the-middle assumes the trusted identity could happen.

Would it surprise you that according to some analysis, some certificates might still support SSL Version 2.0? According to one researcher, as of July 2010 only about 38% of sites using SSL are configured correctly, and 32% contain a previously exposed renegotiation vulnerability. Other researchers exposed approximately 24 possible exploits (of varying criticality) involving man-in-the-middle attacks on SSL when used in browsers.

Most recently in February 2011 Trusteer reported on some nasty malware they named OddJob. OddJob targets online banking customers. According to Trusteer, OddJob does not reside on the client and thus avoids detection by typical anti-malware software. A fresh copy of OddJob is fetched from a command and control server during a session. OddJob hijacks a session token ID, and reportedly allows the hacker to, essentially, ride-along in the background with the user’s session. Of most concern, OddJob allows the hackers to stay logged in to one’s account even after the user purports to log-out; thus, maximizing the potential for undetected (or later detected) fraud. Significantly, client side (user-based) malware presents possible risk, some of which may be beyond the online website’s control.

So, if we presume that no technology will be absolutely 100% safe and secure, and if the right bad-guys want to target someone or something, why the need to tell users something that is not necessarily accurate?

This is only one example of good practices in vetting what you are actually doing to see how it really measures-up, and how your public facing policies may seem accurate, when they really are not. This article focuses on one aspect of security, but the same types of issues arise in privacy as well. Why expose your business to more regulatory risk if there is a breach? Even if you employed good practices and did your best to try to protect the information, false or misleading information in your public facing terms and policies can come back to haunt you.

Appointing experienced information governance individuals or teams, or using outside resources, can help you identify the disconnects and gaps between what exists, and what you say exists.

New Federal Law Prohibits “Data Passes” and “Negative Option” Marketing

Monday, March 7th, 2011

New Laws Place Restrictions and Limits on After Sale Data Passes and Negative Option Marketing

On December 29, 2010, President Obama signed the “Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act” into law. This new law places restrictions and limits on after sale “data passes” and “negative option” marketing through Internet sales.   Senator John D. (Jay) Rockfeller, IV Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation originally introduced the Bill, ultimately becoming this law, in May after the Senate conducted hearings into the practices of Affinion, Vertrue, and Webloyalty.  The Committee published information about the objectionable practices.  The New York Attorney General’s Office had also opened an investigation against these companies resulting in multi-million dollar settlements.

In a nutshell, these third-parties were offering various membership clubs to users of e-commerce sites. Typically, when a user of an e-commerce site completed an online purchase, that user would be re-directed to join a membership discount club for promotions, rebates, and the like. The user never had to re-enter his or her credit card, because the card information was passed off from the e-commerce site where the user just completed a transaction. Many users apparently did not understand that their credit cards would be charged, since they did not need to re-enter credit card data at the membership club registration. The clubs then typically offered a free trial period after which the user’s credit card would be charged if they did not cancel the membership. If not cancelled, the club operator placed recurring monthly charges to the user’s credit card. In general, the process of interpreting silence as acceptance or automatically charging the user unless they cancelled is a “negative option” sale.

The law prohibits an initial e-commerce vendor from passing-off a user’s credit card information to a third-party in a post-transaction sale for the purposes of that post-transaction third-party’s sale of goods or services to the user.

The law makes it unlawful for a post-transaction third-party seller to charge or attempt to charge a user’s credit or debit card, or bank or other financial account for an Internet sale, unless:

(1) before obtaining the consumer’s billing information, the post-transaction third party seller has clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the consumer all material terms of the transaction, including: (A) a description of the goods or services being offered; (B) the fact that the post-transaction third party seller is not affiliated with the initial merchant, which may include disclosure of the name of the post-transaction third party in a manner that clearly differentiates the post transaction third party seller from the initial merchant; and, (C) the cost of such goods or services; and, (2) the post-transaction third party seller has received the express informed consent for the charge from the consumer whose credit card, debit card, bank account, or other financial account will be charged by: (A) obtaining from the consumer— (i) the full account number of the account to be charged; and (ii) the consumer’s name and address and a means to contact the consumer; and (B) requiring the consumer to perform an additional affirmative action, such as clicking on a confirmation button or checking a box that indicates the consumer’s consent to be charged the amount disclosed.”

The law also makes “negative option” sales illegal unless the seller:

“(1) provides text that clearly and conspicuously discloses all material terms of the transaction before obtaining the consumer’s billing information; (2) obtains a consumer’s express informed consent before charging the consumer’s credit card, debit card, bank account, or other financial account for products or services through such transaction; and (3) provides simple mechanisms for a consumer to stop recurring charges from being placed on the consumer’s credit card, debit card, bank account, or other financial account.”

The law gives the Federal Trade Commission enforcement authority, and also allows state attorneys general to enforce the law, with the remedies and penalties available under the Federal Trade Commission Act.

There has been some confusion generated in online content about this law. Apparently, some are concerned that the law absolutely prevents any post-transaction up-selling, even if it were done by the first-party website where the user made the initial purchase.

However, the law defines a “post-transaction third party seller’’ as one who:

“(A) sells, or offers for sale, any good or service on the Internet; (B) solicits the purchase of such goods or services on the Internet through an initial merchant after the consumer has initiated a transaction with the initial merchant; and (C) is not: (i) the initial merchant; (ii) a subsidiary or corporate affiliate of the initial merchant; or (iii) a successor of an entity described in clause (i) or (ii).”

Thus, it seems fairly clear that an “initial merchant” is not prevented from post-transaction marketing, but is clearly prevented from passing the financial data allowing the charging of the user to another entity. Nevertheless, if e-commerce vendors are cross-selling through any non-subsidiary or corporate affiliate strategic alliances, they should ensure that data passes are not made, and the entity to which the user is referred complies with all transparency obligations. All should note the requirements on “negative option” sales.

What Does the Future Hold … Less Free Content?

Monday, January 3rd, 2011

Do-Not-Track and Online Behavioral Advertising

If you’ve been listening, you are aware of the Federal Trade Commission’s December 2010 Preliminary Staff Report: Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change. (Update: The final FTC Privacy Report has been released.) You also know the Commission has challenged providers to create “Do-Not-Track” technology allowing users to opt-out from on-line behavioral advertising. Reportedly, those things are already in the works. This sounds great, especially to a hermit curmudgeon like me (I can’t delete Flash cookies fast enough). But what are some of the implications of this?

There’s a funny and intriguing article by Jack Shafer on Slate.com in which he ponders who is in the best position to create a web browser that provides robust security for the user. While Mr. Shafer points out that he is not against advertising, he notes it’s not in the best interest of developers to provide iron-clad browsers preventing web-tracking technology because of financial connections to advertising revenue. He also perhaps aptly notes, while he is in favor of the legitimate uses for cookies, “too many Web entrepreneurs observe no limits when they decide to snoop.”

Mr. Shafer postulates there may be a market for such a browser, but includes a quote (sure to become a classic in my book) from his colleague Farhad Manjoo: “I doubt there’s a market for such a browser. People don’t care about privacy. They just say they do. If they did, they wouldn’t use Facebook.”

So, which is it? Are users really ready to give up free content in exchange for privacy? According to a recent Gallup poll 61% of individuals polled felt the privacy intrusion presented by tracking was not worth the free access to content. 67% said that advertisers should not be able to match ads to specific interests based upon websites visited.

What about the other 33-39%? Do they really not care, or are they not willing to give-up the Web they know and love?

How about exploring another option? What if I go to Harry’s Widget Shoppe and I decide to tell Harry that I am extremely interested in buying maroon widgets (we all know they’re the best)? Suppose I also tell Harry to contact me immediately if he comes across any maroon widgets (not blue, yellow or green – just maroon). Why should I have to receive 264 e-mails and see 400 ads in the course of 48 hours from Mildred telling me about how great her blue widgets are? I don’t want blue widgets! I had plenty of them, and they’re nothing but trouble. By the same token, I’m not so hip on seeing 918 ads about teeth whitening either (Note to self: make an appointment with the dentist).

Assuming Mildred paid to obtain my “widget” profile from Harry or one of his network servers, what did she really get for her money? Not much. She probably guaranteed that I won’t buy any widgets from her ever. Well, maybe, if it’s an especially rare maroon widget…you know…like the ones with feathers…and she buys me dinner). I also might not be talking to Harry anytime soon, either. But, I digress…

Harry has valuable information about me. Information that may well be worth much more to an advertiser than the fact that I visited Harry’s Widget Shoppe.com. What if Harry asked me if it was okay if he provided my information to others who had maroon widgets? What if Harry also told me that these others with whom he shared my information were contractually obligated not to send my information on to anyone else without my permission? Ye Olde Only Maroon Widget Shoppe.com might be willing to pay Harry dearly for that information, I might get my pick of lovely maroon widgets, I won’t see constant ads from other widget sellers in which I have no interest, and my in-box would be much more manageable. Oh, and by the way, I would not feel as if I had totally lost control over information about me.

At its heart, control is a form of choice. While realistically, we have very little real choice left in this world, there are some things we still would like to control. I figure a good proportion of that 33-39% might say the same. I might be willing to share some information, and let you pass it on, if I knew you were not surreptitiously taking it from me, and abiding by my wishes.

So, I suppose the upshot is, it looks like it’s time for business to start asking me for my information and what controls can be placed on it. Through that process alone, the real value in the information is revealed, and I don’t feel swindled.

Just some thoughts, but I could be wrong. Let’s take another poll.